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This paper presents a model of institutional choice over time, where institutional
arrangements arise endogenously in response to the need for protection of property.
Variable returns to investment in new technology create technological inequality between
households, which in turn inﬂuences what institutional arrangement is chosen. The type
of institution chosen in one period then aﬀects subsequent economic outcomes in a way
that tends to reinforce the existing institutional arrangement in the next period. This
feedback eﬀect makes institutions persistent over time. A change in the prevailing
institution occurs only when particular realizations of the technological development
process happen to counteract the institutional feedback eﬀect. The longer a particular
institution is in place, the less likely it is that this feedback eﬀect can be overcome.
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This paper examines two important questions regarding the nature and dynamics of institu-
tions; why are institutions persistent and why do they change? On the one hand, historical
observation seems to suggest that institutions broadly deﬁned tend to become entrenched
in society for long periods of time. For example, many democracies in North America and
Western Europe have been democracies for centuries. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
(2001) ﬁnd a strong correlation in former European colonies between existing institutions
and those institutions that were originally put in place by colonizers, often hundreds of years
earlier. Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) examine the economic eﬀects of legal origins, exploiting
the fact that legal systems in many countries today can be linked either to English common
law or French civil law that was formed back in the 12th and 13th century.
On the other hand, there are historical examples suggesting that these same institutions
are subject to infrequent, radical change. The last century alone has seen economic and
political change ranging from communist revolution in Russia, China and Cuba, to dramatic
land reform in South Korea, to a wave of democratization in Latin America.
In their discussion of institutions as the fundamental cause of long run growth, Ace-
moglu, Johnson and Robinson (2004) state that, ‘...though we know that institutions, both
economic and political, persist for long periods of time, often centuries (and sometimes
millenia), we do not as yet have a satisfactory understanding of the mechanisms through
which instiutions persist. Second, and closely related, although institutions do generally
persist, sometimes they change.’
How to reconcile both of these stylized facts about institutions in a single model is not
immediately obvious. On the one hand, imposing exogenous lock-in eﬀects or large set
up costs can generate institutional persistence, but not infrequent change. On the other
hand, allowing the institutional arrangement to be a costless choice variable can generate
lots of change but not much persistence. This paper presents a model of both endogenous
institutional persistence and infrequent change, where two groups of agents (households)
can choose between alternative institutional arrangements to protect private property.
Because of the possibility of theft, the two households must continually spend resources
2to protect their property from each other. The particular method (institution) by which this
is achieved can be chosen each period, and in general depends on two factors: the current
technology levels of the two households (in absolute terms) and the technology gap between
them. Both households invest resources in discovering new technology in each period, but
because of the uncertain nature of this innovation process, even the same investment by
both households can yield diﬀerent returns. Hence over time the two households can have
divergent paths of technological development, which in turn can aﬀect the institution chosen
in any given period.
The endogenous persistence of institutions in the model arises from the fact that an
institution chosen in one period aﬀects subsequent economic outcomes in a way that re-
inforces the existing institutional arrangement in the next period. For example, under an
institution that promotes equality between the two households, both households make the
same investment in discovering new technology. This in turn increases the probability that
the households will remain relatively equal, so that they will choose the same equality-
promoting institution in the same period. On the other hand, under an instiution that
promotes inequality, one household is able to invest more in discovering new technology
than the other. This reinforces (or even increases) the existing inequality such that the
same inequality-promoting institution is chosen in the next period.
Even though this institutional feedback eﬀect contributes to the persistence of the pre-
vailing institution, change can still occur because of the uncertain return associated with
the innovative process by which new technology is acquired. Because of this variability, it is
still possible for the relative technologies of the two households to diverge under an institu-
tion that promotes equality and to converge under an institution that promotes inequality.
Hence a change in the prevailing institution occurs only when a particular realization of
the technological development process is able to counteract the institutional feedback eﬀect.
However as we show, the longer a particular institution is in place the less likely it is that
this feedback eﬀect can be overcome.
In addition to characterizing endogenous institutional choice, persistence and infrequent
change, our model also incorporates other key features of institutions that have been ad-
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costly. For example, consider a comparison between diﬀerent political institutions. Autoc-
racies can create opportunities for those with economic and political power to expropriate
resources from other agents, creating deadweight loss and a climate that discourages invest-
ment and growth. But Acemoglu (2004) argues that democracies may be used to engage
in costly and ineﬃcient redistribution activities. Democracies also must incur substantial
costs for conducting elections and maintaining various checks and balances on power. The
fact that both types of political institutions are costly may help to explain why Barro (1997)
ﬁnds no clear evidence that democracy (or any particular political institution) is best for
growth. In keeping with this idea, we model institutions as cost parameters. Households
can choose alternative institutions that protect private property, but never at zero cost. We
assume not only that institutions are costly, but that certain costs must be incurred on a
continual basis. Here we emphasize the fact that the true cost of institutions is in their
enforcement rather than a one-time setup cost.
A second important feature highlighted in Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2004) is
that institutional choice is rooted in social conﬂict. Following from North (1981), those in
government (those who hold political power) are self-interested, seeking to maximize their
own welfare rather than the collective welfare of all agents in the society. This awareness
leads to a power struggle among diﬀerent groups to hold political power in order to establish
their preferred institutions. In our model, each household prefers the particular institutional
arrangement that maximizes its own expected utility. Given a suﬃcient divergence in
technology, the two households will prefer diﬀerent institutions, creating social conﬂict that
is resolved either by compromise or by unilateral action on the part of one household.
One of the implications of this social conﬂict view of institutions is that vested interests
who hold political power will often choose to maintain sub-optimal institutional arrange-
ments for their own private gain. Acemoglu et al. relate the example of ruling monarchs in
Russia and Austria-Hungary who saw industrialization as a threat to their power and hence
took action to prevent it. In a similar vein, within our model one household may seek to
maintain a costly ineﬃcient institutional arrangment that reinforces its dominance over the
other household. In this case, the dominant household engages in wasteful expropriation
4behaviour to maximize its own welfare and at the same time reinforce existing inequality
between the two households.
Related to this point, the primary cause of social conﬂict over alternative institutional
arrangements is the simple fact that diﬀerent institutions lead to diﬀerent distributions of
resources. This implies that inequality is important for understanding institutional choice.
Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997) for example, argue that inequality is a key factor in both the
determination and stability of institutions. For example, in the Latin American colonies,
the geographic and climatic conditions were such that agriculture (production of cash crops)
was most eﬃcient on large scale farms. This resulted in a large wedge between an elite of
wealthy land owners and a poor, landless majority. This inequality was reinforced by the
immigration policies of Spain (which controlled many of these Latin American colonies),
which restricted immigration to the colonies to its wealthiest citizens. In contrast, the geo-
graphic and climatic conditions in the North American colonies gave rise to crop production
which did not beneﬁt greatly from economies of scale, leading to an abundance of small
and middle size family farms. Since the immigration policies of Britain and France also
encouraged migration of the middle class to the colonies, a strong middle class emerged
in North America. Engerman and Sokoloﬀ point to these diﬀerences in equality as key to
explaining the divergent paths of institutions in the two sets of colonies that persist to this
day.
Inequality also plays a key role in Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2001) theoretical model
of political determination and transition between democracy and autocracy. A key factor
that determines the political outcome in their model is the level of inequality between rich
and poor agents. In a democracy, the poor agents (who are more numerous) set the tax
rate. A greater level of inequality means that in a democracy there will be a greater degree
of redistribution from rich to poor. As a result, the rich elite will be more likely to hold on
to power (or gain power through a coup) in order to prevent democracy from taking root.
In our model, inequality plays a crucial role both in institutional choice and persis-
tence. Regarding choice, technological inequality aﬀects the relative costs of alternative
instiutional arrangements, which in turn aﬀects which institution is adopted by the two
5households. Regarding persistence, technological inequality is the mechanism by which eco-
nomic outcomes feed back into the existing institutional arrangement, creating a tendency
for the current institution to be adopted in the following period. Given this feedback eﬀect
alone, institutions in our model would almost always persist forever. However because of
the uncertainty inherent in technological advance, it is possible for the level of technological
inequality between the two households to change counter to the what would otherwise be
implied by the existing institution. It is exactly this possibility that opens the door to
institutional change in our model.
Acemoglu et al. point to the development of property rights in England as an example of
how institution persistence was overturned by changes in the presiding level of inequality.
For centuries English monarchs maintained political and economic dominance, providing
general property rights (when convenient) while at the same time expropriating resources
for their own purposes. This ability to expropriate reinforced the inequality between the
monarchy and the citizenry, which in turn entrenched the dominant position of the monar-
chy. However, with the rise of Atlantic trade in the 16th and 17th century, the economic
power of landowners and merchants began to rise, independent of the power of the monar-
chy. Because of this new economic power, the expropriative power of the monarchy was
no longer suﬃcient to maintain existing inequality, so that the dominance of the monarchy
began to decline. Eventually, relative inequality fell enough that landowners and merchants
were able to challenge the power of the monarchy and establish new institutions that would
reinforce equality rather than inequality.
The rest of the paper is set out as follows: section 2 presents the basic model, while sec-
tions 3 and 4 examine institutional choice and persistence respectively. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Description of Households
To begin, suppose that there are two households who both inhabit a ﬁxed region of land M
that can be used for food production. Each household has a constant population N (nor-
malized to 1) in all time periods t, where each time period denotes a generation. Household
6members are identical and live for two periods, so that a member of generation t is born and
raised in period t−1 and then lives as an adult in period t. Household members only make
economic decisions in their adult life. In each generation, household wealth is deﬁned as
aitM, where ait is the technology of household i in period t. Hence increases in technology
raise household wealth by increasing the productive capacity of its land.
The deﬁning characteristic of a household is that the protection of private property
within the household is given. For example, if household members are closely related (ie,
there are no ‘strangers’) then mutual trust and accountability could conceivably provide a
suﬃcient enforcement mechanism to protect property and maintain standards of conduct
within the household. However while there may not be strangers among members of the
same household, members of diﬀerent households are always strangers. Because mutual
trust, accountability and social pressure cannot apply to strangers, there is no possibility
for the two households to coexist without some mechanism to protect private property.
In each generation, a household has both a desire to consume and a bequest motive.
Household i’s utility at time t is given by
uit = (1 − γ)log(cit) + γ log(ai,t+1M) (1)
where γ ∈ (0,1), cit is the consumption of the household (which is split evenly among all
household members) and ai,t+1M is the wealth of the household passed on to the next
generation. Consumption is derived directly from agricultural production, which depends
on labour and the value of land holdings according to
yit = L1−α
it (aitM)α
Each member of household i is endowed with a unit of time in his adult life which can
be put towards the following activities:
(i) agricultural labour (Lit);
(ii) development of better technology (φa
i); and
(iii) fulﬁlling institutional requirements (τit).
The exact form of the institutional cost τit will depend on the institutional arrangement
chosen by the two households, which we describe in detail below. It is important to note at
7this point that all possible institutions are costly to the household, and that these costs are
incurred in every period. This implies that economic considerations will determine which
institution is chosen, creating an important feedback eﬀect from economic outcomes back
into existing institutions.
Following from the time limitation described above, agricultural production is subject
to the constraint
Lit + τit + φa
i ≤ 1
With no utility from leisure, household members will use all of their time endowment in
every period. Hence we have that production is given by
yit = (1 − τit − φa
i)1−α(aitM)α
and that the (expected) utility of household i in period t is given by
uit = (1 − γ)log(cit) + γ log(ai,t+1M) (2)
where
cit = yit = (1 − τi − φa
i)1−α(aitM)α
Given an investment in acquiring new technology φa
i, the technology passed on to the
next generation is given by
ai,t+1 = (²itAtφa
i)µ(ait)1−µ (3)
where µ ∈ (0,1) and At is some exogenous measure of the technological frontier, taken as
given by both households in each period.
The factor ²it is an idiosyncratic shock that reﬂects the uncertainty that is inherent in
the development of new technology. We assume that ²it is uniformly distributed on the
interval [²L,²H] with E(²it) = ¯ ². Households know the expected value of the shock when
they make their investment decisions, but ²it is realized only after these decisions are taken.
Realizations of the shock are independent across time and across the two households, so
that even if both households invest the same amount of time in technological improvement
φa
i, their technology levels can advance at diﬀerent rates.
Note that a household will always choose a positive level of investment in new technology
since φa
i = 0 leads to ai,t+1 = 0. Keeping in mind that each period t is a generation, the
8idea here is that part of φa
i includes time spent educating the younger generation. At the
extreme then, φa
i = 0 would imply that a totally uneducated younger generation would be
unable to produce any output from the household’s land.
2.2 Timing
The timing of the model is as follows. At the beginning of period t, the generation of
children in household i enters adulthood, observes the state of the world and makes decisions
accordingly. It is important to note that there is no state uncertainty at the time when the
household members make their decisions.
Each period is divided into 3 stages.
Stage 1: Having observed the state of the world, the two households choose an institutional
arrangement It from a set of institutional choices {Dt,Pt,Tt,Wt}. We describe each of these
institutional choices in detail in the next subsection.
Stage 2: Taking into account the time commitment associated with the prevailing in-
stitutional arrangement chosen in stage 1, household i chooses φa
i in order to allocate its
remaining endowment of time optimally between agricultural labour and investment in new
technology.
Stage 3: The two households consume cit from their agricultural output yit. At this
point the realization of ²it is known, the new stock of technology ai,t+1 is passed on to the
next generation and the current adult generation dies.
2.3 Institutional Choices
Here we present the details of each institutional alternative available to the households.
Private Defense (D)
We suppose that the most basic institutional arrangement is to have no arrangement at
all. In this case, the institutional cost faced by a household will consist only of the amount
of time required to defend its land holdings from the rival household. This defense cost,
which we denote by τd
it is assumed to be increasing in the value of a household’s land, aitM.
Higher land values imply higher protection costs because with larger output yields, more
output must be protected from the rival household.
9This institutional cost can be paid either by all household members devoting a fraction of
their time to land defense, or by the household designating certain members to be full-time
defenders.1 We assume that τd
it = {0,τd(aitM)}, so that the household must either defend
all of its land eﬀectively or not defend it at all (in other words, it cannot choose to defend
some positive fraction of its land.) If household i chooses τd
it = 0, its agricultural production
can be stolen by household j (at no cost to household j), yielding zero consumption and
negative inﬁnite utility to household i. Hence given no institutional arrangement between
the two households in period t, τit = τd(aitM) for household i.
Driven by the bequest motive in utility, households will choose to invest time in de-
veloping new technology in order to pass new wealth onto the next generation. However,
because the cost of defending land τd(aitM) is increasing in the value of land holdings,
households will face ever increasing costs as members are forced to divert larger and larger
amounts of time away from productive activities like agricultural labour in order to defend
their land from the opposing household. This implies that as technology and land values
increase over time, the cost of private property protection becomes suﬃciently high that
the two households will eventually seek alternative institutional arrangements.
Power Sharing (P)
In a formal power sharing arrangement, each household agrees to pay one half of the costs re-
quired to set up and enforce a legal system which ensures the protection of private property,
both within a household, and across households. The total cost of this system (including
maintenance and enforcement costs) is τp, so that institutional cost paid by a single house-
hold under this arrangement is τit = τp
2 . As with the cost of private defense, the cost of
enforcing the formal property rights system can either be split evenly among household
members or can be delegated to certain individuals (eg. to create a full-time police force
and justice system.)
In this institutional setting, the two households share power equally, and the legal system
in place prevents any abuse of power either by an individual member or by an individual
household. In other words, τp includes the cost of various checks and balances on power
1Since all household members are assumed to be identical, distinguishing between these two cases is
unimportant.
10that are necessary to prevent one household from cheating the other out of property or
resources.
Takeover (T)
In a takeover arrangement, the two households enter an unequal power sharing arrangement
where one household dominates the other. In this case, the dominant household incurs all
of the costs required to set up and enforce a system of law and property rights, denoted by
τT. However, because only one household is in control of the property rights system, there
is no costly self-enforcement or checks or balances on power for the dominant household.
We therefore assume that τT < τp. At the same time, in order to ensure that a household
may prefer either power sharing or takeover, we assume that τT > τp/2.
Not only is the property rights system in this case less costly, but it is also of lower qual-
ity. This is because without checks and balances on power there is no guard against expro-
priation of resources. Since the dominant household holds all of the power of enforcement,
the members of the dominated household have little protection against unilateral action
against their property and resources. Suppose (without loss of generality) that household
i dominates j under this arrangement. Then let β be the endogenous fraction of labour
eﬀort that household i can expropriate from household j. For simplicity, we assume that
labour eﬀort is the only resource that i can extract from j (technology and land belonging
to household j cannot be expropriated.)
The expropriation activity of household i is costly in itself, so that for time β extracted
from household j, the additional time available to household i is β(1−qit), where qit ∈ (0,1)
is the cost of expropriation. This expropriation cost is decreasing in the technological
gap between the two households ait
ajt, so that it is less costly for a dominant household to
expropriate resources the larger is its technological advantage.
With household i as the dominant household, we have then that under a takeover
arrangement, the institutional cost paid by household j is τjt = β and the institutional cost
paid by household i is τit = τT − β(1 − qit). Both households have full information about
each other, and so household i is able to extract the highest possible transfer. Formally, we
11have that
β∗ = min{1/2,βmax}
By assumption, household i can extract a maximum of 50% of the resources of household
j in a given period. Conditional on being below 50%, βmax is the value of the transfer
such that household j is just indiﬀerent between the takeover arrangement and its outside
option, which is to ﬁght a war.
War (W)
The ﬁnal institutional option available to both households is to ﬁght a war. In this case,
both households devote a fraction τw of their time to ﬁght each other. This fraction of time
is exogenous and constant across the two households. Here we assume only that τw < τp
2 .
At the end of the war in period t, the winning household is able to consume and bequest
wealth to the next generation in the same way as under other institutional arrangements.
The losing household on the other hand, while still able to consume its agricultural produc-
tion from the current period, suﬀers a loss in technology. As a result it can bequest only
aLM to generation t+1, where aL = (²itAtφa
i)µ(a0)1−µ, with a0 denoting some initial base
level of technology available in period 0. After the bequest takes place, the t + 1 genera-
tion of the losing household is subsequently terminated (either killed or absorbed into the
winning household.)
Given that the two households have the same population, and that both make the same
investment τw in the war, the only factor that determines the probability of winning a war is
the relative technology of the two households. Let pi(ait
ajt) be the probability that household
i wins a war with household j during time period t. We then assume that pi(1) = 1/2 and
that pi(ait
ajt) is increasing in the technology gap ait
ajt.
When a war is fought it is always decisive, so that pit + pjt = 1 (ie, there are no
stalemates.) The outcome of the war is not decided until stage 3 of the period. Hence, in
the case of war, a household’s expected utility can be written as
uW
it = (1 − γ)log(cit) + γ[pit log(ai,t+1M) + (1 − pit log(aLM))] (4)
122.4 Optimal Time Investment
Recall from the discussion of the timing of the model that each period can be divided into
3 stages. Before we analyze the optimal institutional choice that occurs in stage 1, we ﬁrst
look at the optimal time investment decision in stage 2, taking the institutional arrangement
as given. Substituting for cit, and ai,t+1 in the utility function, we have
uit = [α(1 − γ) + (1 − µ)γ]log(ait) + [α(1 − γ) + γ]log(M)
+(1 − α)(1 − γ)log(1 − τit − φa
i) + µγ(logφa
i + log(At)) + µγEt[log²it] (5)
At the beginning of stage 2, the new adult generation chooses how much time to invest
in new technology (φa
i) in order to maximize household utility, subject to the constraint
that each household member has 1−τit units of time to devote to either agricultural labour
or development of new technology. From the ﬁrst order condition for φa
i we have that
φa∗ =
µγ(1 − τit)
(1 − α)(1 − γ) + µγ
(6)
And the optimal fraction of time spent in agricultural labour is therefore
1 − τit − φa∗
i =
(1 − α)(1 − γ)(1 − τit)
(1 − α)(1 − γ) + µγ
Substituting back into the utility function gives
u∗
it = Kit + klog(1 − τit) (7)
where k = (1 − α)(1 − γ) + µγ and
Kit = [α(1 − γ) + (1 − µ)γ]log(ait) + [α(1 − γ) + γ]log(M) + µγ log(At) + µγEt[log²it]
+(1 − α)(1 − γ)log[
(1 − α)(1 − γ)
(1 − α)(1 − γ) + µγ
] + µγ log[
µγ
(1 − α)(1 − γ) + µγ
]
Since Kit does not depend on the speciﬁc institutional cost incurred by the household, it is a
common element in the expected utility of household i under every institutional possibility.
If we then deﬁne uI
it = u∗
it−Kit as the relative payoﬀ to household i for a given institutional
arrangement, then the relative payoﬀ under private defense is
uD
it = klog(1 − τd(aitM)) (8)
13The relative payoﬀ under power sharing is
uP




The relative payoﬀ given war is
uW




where the last term is a relative adjustment that results from the fact that with probability
1 − pit the household suﬀers a technology loss. Note that this technology loss is increasing
in the level of current technology ait.
Finally, the relative payoﬀ under takeover is
uT
it = klog(1 − τT + β∗(1 − qit)) (11)
Given that the relative payoﬀ to household j (the less dominant household) under takeover
is uT
jt = klog(1 − β) we have that





3 Optimal Institutional Choice
In this section we examine how in stage 1 of a period the two households make decisions
about what institutional arrangements (if any) should exist between them. First, we deﬁne
Iit and Ijt as the respective institutional preferences of households i and j. Then let It
denote the actual institutional arrangement that is implemented between the two households
in period t. Iit, Ijt and It are all drawn from the set {Dt,Pt,Tt,Wt}. Without loss of
generality, we assume that household i is the more technologically advanced household at
time t (ie, ait ≥ ajt.)
When the institutional preferences of household i and j ﬁt together, then the prevailing
institutional arrangement is obvious. The key then to fully characterizing stage 1 is to
understand what happens when the preferences of the two households do not agree. To do
this, we ﬁrst classify each institutional choice as either a unilateral or bilateral action.
Assumption 1:
(i) A declaration of war (Wt) by either household is a unilateral action.
14(ii) Instituting a power sharing arrangement (Pt) between the two households is a bilateral
action. One household cannot impose power sharing on the other.
(iii) Takeover of household j by household i (Tt) is a unilateral action. In such a case, war
is the only alternative response available to household j.
(iv) In the absence of any unilateral actions by one household, both households can choose
private defense (Dt).
Next we make two additional assumptions regarding the cost of private property defense
for a household. Assumption 2 rules out the case where the two households always choose to
ﬁght a war in the ﬁrst generation. Assumption 3 rules out the case where the two households
never choose to ﬁght a war at any time.
Assumption 2:
Let a0 denote some initial level of technology for both households in period 0. The cost of
private property defense given this initial level of technology is suﬃciently small such that
τd(a0M) < τw.
Assumption 3:





(1 − τd(ai0))(1 − µ)γ
2k(ai0)2
Now we are in a position to begin to characterize the institutional choices of the house-
holds. As a ﬁrst step we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Given two households i and j where ait ≥ ajt, and given assumptions 1
and 2, the institutional arrangement between the two households in any period t (It) always
reﬂects the preferences of household i (Iit) where:
(i) Iit is drawn from the set {Dt,Pt,Tt,Wt} when τd(ajtM) ≥ τp/2;
(ii) Iit is drawn from the set {Dt,Tt,Wt} when τd(ajtM) < τp/2.
Proof: See Appendix.
As a consequence of proposition 1, we can conﬁne the analysis of institutional choice
to the choices made by household i in each generation. The only complicating factor that
can arise with this simpliﬁcation is when Iit = Pt but Ijt = Dt. In this case, because
15power sharing is a bilateral action, household i cannot impose it without the agreement of
household j. Hence the choice set for household i does not include Pt in case (ii).
Using proposition 1, we can deﬁne It to be a function of the state of the world from
household i’s perspective. The state of the world at time t is given by (ait,ajt, ¯ W), where
¯ W is an indicator which takes the value of 1 if war has been fought in a past period,
and 0 otherwise. Recall that a war is always decisive, so that ¯ W = 1 means that the
dominant household is the only remaining household. In this case there is no property
rights problem and the household’s decisions are trivial. For the rest of the paper we ignore
this uninteresting case and assume that ¯ W = 0.
It is important to note that with the exception of ¯ W, no institutional details appear as
state variables. This reﬂects the fact that there is no exogenous institutional persistence,
and that the prevailing institution is a choice variable for the households in every period.
At this point we partition the analysis into two separate stages: initial development and
later development. We do this by noting that there exists some critical level of technology
adp such that τd(adpM) = τp/2. At this critical level of technology, households are just
indiﬀerent between private defense and power sharing.
3.1 Phase 1: Initial Development (ajt < adp)
At the beginning of period t, household i (the technologically dominant household) compares
the expected relative payoﬀ with no institutional arrangement (private defense) with the
expected relative payoﬀs of takeover and war with household j. Because of household j’s
low level of technology, it will always prefer private defense to a power sharing arrangement,
so that household i’s institutional choice set is given by case (ii) in proposition 1.
To determine what institution will be chosen for any given combination of technologies,






it . For any technology level ajt < adp, this function gives the technology
level ait such that household i will be just indiﬀerent between private defense and ﬁghting
a war. Note that increases in ait decrease the payoﬀ to both private defense and war, but
16by assumption 3 the payoﬀ to private defense falls faster. Hence, for any technology level
above adw
it , household i will prefer war to private defense, and for any technology level below
adw
it , household i will prefer private defense to war.






it. For any technology level ajt < adp, this function gives the technology
level ait such that household i will be indiﬀerent between private defense and takeover.
Note that for ait > adt
it, the payoﬀ to private defense will fall and the payoﬀ to takeover will
rise. Hence, household i will prefer takeover to private defense above adt
it and similarly will
prefer private defense to takeover when below adt
it.






it . In other words, for any technology level ajt < adp, this function gives
the technology level ait such that household i will be indiﬀerent between takeover and war.
Note that for ait > atw
it , the payoﬀ to both institutions will rise. However, because of an
increase in the technology gap, there is a negative level eﬀect on the payoﬀ to war. This
means that household i must prefer takeover to war above atw
it and similarly will prefer war
to takeover when below atw
it .
Using the critical values described above leads us to the following proposition.
Proposition 2: When ajt < adp, assumptions 1 - 3 hold, and a war has not occurred
in any previous period, then the institutional arrangement between households i and j in














Proposition 2 is illustrated in Figure 1. Since by assumption household i is always the
technologically dominant household, only the region above the 45 degree line is relevant.
Also, since in the initial development case ajt < adp, we map out only the region of possible















Figure 1: Institutional Choice in Initial Development
The important result of proposition 2 and ﬁgure 1 is that the institution chosen depends
on both the technology levels of the two households and the technology gap between them.
In general, private defense continues as the institution of choice when the technology gap
is small. War occurs when the technology gap becomes large at a low level of technological
development. Household i chooses to takeover household j in the intermediate case, when
technology is reasonably advanced and there is a suﬃciently large technology gap.
3.2 Phase 2: Later Development (ajt ≥ adp)
Once both households’ technology reaches the level adp or greater, a power sharing arrange-
ment will always be preferred to private defense. In this case, power sharing becomes the
benchmark against which war and takeover are compared.








it . For any technology level ajt ≥ adp, this function gives the technology
18level ait such that household i will be just indiﬀerent between power sharing and ﬁghting a
war. Note that increases in ait decrease the payoﬀ to war. Hence, for any technology level
above a
pw
it , household i will prefer power sharing to war, and for any technology level below
a
pw
it , household i will prefer war to power sharing.








it. For any technology level ajt ≥ adp, this function gives the technology
level ait such that household i will be just indiﬀerent between power sharing and takeover.
Note that for ait > a
pt
it, the payoﬀ to takeover will rise while the payoﬀ to power sharing is
unchanged. Hence, household i will prefer takeover to power sharing above a
pt
it and similarly
will prefer power sharing to takeover when below a
pt
it.
Using these two critical values described above leads us to proposition 3.
Proposition 3: When ait,ajt ≥ adp, assumptions 1 - 3 hold, and a war has not occurred
in any previous period, then the institutional arrangement between households i and j in
















Proposition 3 is illustrated in Figure 2. Once again the institution chosen depends on
both the technology levels of the two households and the technology gap between them. In
general, power sharing is the institution of choice as long as the technology gap is small.
Takeover on the other hand occurs when the technology gap becomes suﬃciently large. In
the particular case shown in ﬁgure 1, war is never chosen in the later development stage.
This is because adp is so large that war is never optimal for household i no matter how large
the technology gap is.
Figure 3 combines propositions 2 and 3 by putting both the initial and later development
cases together. Note that all four institutions can be chosen depending on the absolute
and relative technology levels of the two households. However, beyond a certain level of









Figure 2: Institutional Choice in Later Development
we have that:
1. Private defense will be chosen given low levels of technological development and a small
technology gap.
2. Power sharing will be chosen given high levels of technological development and a small
technology gap.
3. War will be chosen given low levels of technological development and a large technology
gap.
2. Takeover will be chosen given high levels of technological development and a large
technology gap.
4 Institutional Persistence
In this section, we examine the persistence of institutions over time, in the absence of exoge-
nous lock-in eﬀects or large switching or setup costs associated with institutions. Speciﬁ-








Figure 3: Institutional Choice in Both Stages of Development
over time, even if every successive generation of households has the opportunity to reeval-
uate the prevailing institutional arrangement. Upon ﬁnding persistence of institutions over
time, we are then interested to know under what (if any) conditions a prevailing institution
may change. In this section we consider two possible cases: joint technological development
and independent technological development.
4.1 Joint Technological Development
In this case, we suppose that if two households enter into an institutional arrangement (Pt
or Tt) then the research eﬀort of both households in the current period is connected in the
following way:
²it = ²jt = max{²it,²jt}
In other words, suppose that both households operate a laboratory of sorts where technolog-
ical development takes place in each period. Under the above assumption, both households
can conduct research at both laboratories, and then take the return on research from the
more successful of the two laboratories. In this case the technological development of the
21two households is connected, but not the same. Even with the same return to innovation
both households maintain their individual technology levels.
An important implication of this joint connection in technological development is that
if both households invest the same amount of time in technological research (φa
i = φa
j = φa)












Note that this is not a special feature of the particular function governing the evolution of
technology in this model. Rather it is simply that a given distance between two technology
levels becomes less important as the levels themselves rise. This implication leads to the
following proposition.
Proposition 4: If there is joint technological development between the two households
under an institutional arrangement (power sharing or takeover) as described above then we
have that:
(i) Power sharing is persistent over time. If It = Pt for any period t, then It+s = Pt+s for
all s > t.
(ii) Takeover is persistent over time given the following suﬃcient condition: if It = Tt for
any period t, and
1 − τT + β∗(1 − qit)
1 − β∗ ≥
ait
ajt
then It+1 = Tt+1.
Proof: See Appendix.
The qualifying condition in (ii) ensures that the technology gap increases (or stays
constant) under takeover, which will in turn increase (or maintain) its attractiveness to
household i relative to power sharing.
A key component of persistence in this case is the feedback between economic and
institutional outcomes. Under power sharing, technology levels converge, which in turn
reinforces power sharing, which then leads to further technological convergence etc. Under
takeover, (given the suﬃcient condition described in proposition 4) technology levels diverge,
which in turn reinforces takeover, which then leads to further technological divergence.
22Note that under joint technological development, there is no other process that can
counteract this institutional feedback eﬀect. Hence the prevailing institution will persist
over time, with little or no chance of an institutional change.
4.2 Independent Technological Development
Now consider the case where the technological development in each household remains
subject to idiosyncratic shocks regardless of what (if any) institutional arrangement exists.
In other words, each household can now only use its own research laboratory. In this case,
the evolution of the technology gap depends both on the relative investment levels of the
households and on the idiosyncratic shocks ²it and ²jt. As a result, it is possible that the
particular realizations of the two household speciﬁc shocks could counteract the institutional
eﬀects on relative investment levels. In this case institutional persistence is not guaranteed.
For simplicity, we examine the long run, where technology accumulates to the point
where war is so unattractive that household i will always be able to extract the maximum
resources from household j (β∗ = 1/2) under takeover. At this stage, the tradeoﬀ between
Pt and Tt is governed by the relative institutional costs faced by household i. Deﬁne ( ai
aj)0
such that







In words, ( ai
aj)0 is the critical level of the technology gap such that household i is just
indiﬀerent between power sharing and takeover.
For values of the technology gap close to ( ai
aj)0, the two households may oscillate between
Pt and Tt based on successive realizations of the technology shocks. For example, if It = Pt,
then φa
i = φa
j, which (as shown earlier) drives
ai,t+1
aj,t+1 below ait
ajt, thereby reinforcing power
sharing in the next period. However, if ²it






ajt, so that the technology gap does not fall, but instead rises enough
to cause a takeover arrangement to be chosen in the next period.
On the other hand suppose that It = Tt, so that φa
i > φa




ajt, thereby reinforcing takeover in the next period. If ²it
²jt is suﬃciently small, then





ajt, so that the technology gap does not rise, but rather
23falls enough to cause a power sharing arrangement to be chosen in the next period.
In both of the above scenarios, institutional change occurs only when the idiosyncratic
shocks in the technological development process happen to outweigh the institutional eﬀect
by a suﬃcient degree. However, because there is no persistence in the ² shocks over time,
remaining under one institutional arrangement for an extended number of periods will tend
to move the households away from ( ai
aj)0. In other words, over a number of periods the
idiosyncratic shocks that both households experience will average out over time, hence the
investment levels of the two households will be the dominant factor in determining long run
movements in the technology gap. As seen in the joint technological development case, time
spent under power sharing will reduce the technology gap further and further below ( ai
aj)0.
But this in turn reduces the probability of either a single combination of shocks {²it,²jt} or
a series of shocks that would be suﬃcient to bring the technology gap above ( ai
aj)0, thereby
causing the households to switch to a takeover arrangement.
On the other hand, (if condition (ii) of proposition 4 holds) time spent under takeover
will tend to increase the average technology gap over time, eventually converging to a value
of (ai
aj)00 = 1
2[1 − τT + 1
2(1 − q((ait
ajt)00))]. Here we denote ( ait
ajt)00 as the highest sustainable
technology gap given the constraint that β∗ ≤ 1/2. Throughout this analysis we have
assumed that ( ai
aj)00 > (ai
aj)0, so that a takeover arrangement can exist in the long run. Once
again, the further the technology gap rises above ( ai
aj)0, the lower the probability that a
single set or series of shocks will occur to bring the technology gap low enough that the
households would change to a power sharing arrangement.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we present a model of institutional formation, choice and persistence over time.
We show that the need for protection of private property and the escalating cost of private
defense of this proverty eventually gives rise to institutional arrangements. Exactly what
institutional arrangement is chosen depends on the relative paths of technological develop-
ment of the two households in the model. A high level of development and relative equality
will generate a power sharing arrangement, while suﬃciently unequal rates of technological
24development will lead to a takeover arrangement. We ﬁnd that institutional arrangements
are persistent over time because current institutions aﬀect investment decisions in such a
way as to reinforce the existing institutions in the future. Certain economic outcomes can
overcome institutional eﬀects and cause institutional change, but this possibility becomes
less likely the longer that an institution remains in place.
256 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1:
Consider the four possible choices that household i can make:
1. Household i chooses Wt:
In this case it does not matter what household j would prefer to do. War is a unilateral
action. If one household wants war, then there will be war. Hence if Iit = Wt then It = Wt.
2. Household i chooses Tt:
In this case, by its very design household j will be indiﬀerent between Tt and Wt, and so
we assume that when indiﬀerent it will choose Tt. Household j cannot choose Pt, because
Pt requires mutual agreement from both households, and in this case household i prefers
Tt. Finally, household j cannot choose Dt, because a takeover bid by household i cannot
be ignored. A takeover bid is a unilateral action, and the only feasible response (other than
surrender to the takeover bid) is to ﬁght a war. Hence if Iit = Tt then It = Tt.
3. Household i chooses Dt:
In this case, household j cannot choose Pt (for the same reason as in 2). Household j will
also not choose Wt in this case, because if Wt is more attractive to household j than Dt,
then this must also be the case for household i. To see this, note that if household j prefers
war then:
klog(1 − τw) − (1 − µ)γ(1 − pjt)log(
ajt
a0
) > klog(1 − τd(ajtM))
With ait ≥ ajt, household i prefers Dt to Wt if














but by assumption 3, the right hand side will be less than zero, which is a contradiction
since pit is non-decreasing in ait.
Finally, since household j is indiﬀerent between Wt and Tt, it will also prefer Dt to Tt.
So, household j will accept Dt. Hence if Iit = Bt then It = Bt.
4. Household i chooses Pt:
Suppose ﬁrst that τd(mjt) < τp/2. In this case household j prefers Bt to Pt and since Pt
26requires bilateral agreement, Pt is not an option for household i. This corresponds to case
(ii) in the proposition.
Next suppose that τd(mjt) ≥ τp/2. In this case household j cannot choose Tt for the
same reason as in 2. Household j will also not choose Bt because the cost of land defence
under Bt exceeds the cost of joint property rights enforcement under Pt. Household j will
not choose Wt over Pt, because by assumption 2 this would imply that household i would
do the same. Finally, since household j is indiﬀerent between Wt and Tt, it will not choose
Tt either. So, household j will accept Pt. Hence if Iit = Pt then It = Pt, which corresponds
to case (i) in the proposition.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 2:





it responds to changes in ajt depends on how the relative payoﬀs to private
defense and war are aﬀected by changes in the technology gap between the two households.
Note that for household i, the payoﬀ to war is increasing in the technology gap while it
has no eﬀect on the payoﬀ to private defense. This then implies that an increase in ajt
will increase the relative payoﬀ to private defense, which in turn requires an increase in ait
(by assumption 3) to maintain equality between the two institutional choices. Hence adw
it is
increasing in ajt.
As with war, the payoﬀ to takeover for household i is increasing in the technology gap
while it has no eﬀect on the payoﬀ to private defense. This then implies that an increase
in ajt will increase the relative payoﬀ to private defense, which in turn requires an increase
in ait to maintain equality between the two institutional choices. Hence adw
it is increasing
in ajt.
Note that since an increase in the technology gap increases the relative payoﬀ to both
war and takeover, atw
it can be either increasing or decreasing in ajt. In general, the slope of
atw
it will depend on the relative sensitivities of pit and qit to changes in the technology gap.
To relate adw
it to adt
it, note ﬁrst that for ajt = aj0, adw
it < adt
it. This is because an increase
27in the level of ait decreases the payoﬀ to war and increase the payoﬀ to takeover. Hence
relative to private defense, the technology level at which household i is indiﬀerent between
war and private defense must be lower than the level at which there is indiﬀerence between
takeover and private defense.
Next, note that for given increases in ajt, adw
it increases faster than adt
it. This is also
because an increase in the level of ait decreases the payoﬀ to war and increase the payoﬀ to
takeover. For higher levels of technology, a higher technology gap is required to maintain
the desirability of war. In contrast, for higher levels of technology, even a lower technology
gap will maintain the desirability of takeover. Hence the slope of adw
it is steeper than the
slope of adt
it.






it when ait > adt
it and uT
it > uW




it when ait > adw
it and uW
it > uT




it when ait < adw
it and uD
it > uT
it when ait < adt
it.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 3:










it have the same general properties as adw
it and adt
it. Hence the proof
follows the same pattern as above.




























it when ait < a
pt
it.
286.4 Proof of Proposition 4:
(i) Suppose that It = Pt. In this case φa is the same for both households. Given the
same level of investment, equation (28) holds and the technology gap decreases from ait
ajt
in period t to ait
ajt
1−µ in period t + 1. What then will be the institutional arrangement
It+1? If household i chose Pt over Dt, then with higher wealth in t + 1, it will certainly
choose Pt+1 over Dt+1. Also, if household i chose Pt over Wt in period t, then with higher
technology and a lower technology gap relative to household j in period t + 1, it will then
choose Pt+1 over Wt+1. Finally, if household i chose Pt over Tt, then in period t + 1, with
higher technology and a lower technology gap, uW
j,t+1 < uW
jt , which means that βt+1 ≤ βt
and so Tt+1 will be even less attractive relative to Pt+1 than Tt was to Pt. Hence It = Pt
implies It+1 = Pt+1 for any t.
(ii) Suppose that It = Tt. Given a technology gap ait






(²(1 − τT + β(1 − q)))µ(ai(t−1))1−µ
(²(1 − β))µ(aj(t−1))1−µ
From this we can see that the technology gap will remain stable or increase over time given
the condition





If household i chose Tt over Dt, then with higher wealth in t+1, it will certainly choose Tt+1
over Dt+1. Also, if household i chose Tt over Wt in period t, then because atw
jt is declining
over time, it will then choose Tt+1 over Wt+1. Finally, if household i chose Tt over Pt, then
in period t+1, with higher technology and a higher technology gap, Tt+1 will be even more
attractive relative to Pt+1 since τT − βt+1(1 − qt+1) > τT − βt+1(1 − qt+1) > τp/2. Hence
It = Tt implies It+1 = Tt+1 for any t.
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